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COMMENTS
MIRANDA GUARANTEES IN THE
CALIFORNIA JUVENILE COURT
In June of 1966, the United States Supreme Court decided the
case of Miranda v. Arizona.' In this decision the court held that a
confession by a suspect during police interrogation would not be
admissible unless the police could prove that the accused freely gave
his statement after receiving the following procedural guarantees.
An adult arrested by the police must be warned of his constitutional
rights when the focus of the investigation changes from investi-
gatory to accusatory.' Before asking the suspect any questions, the
police must tell him that he has the right to remain silent, that he has
the right to have counsel present, that the state will provide counsel
if he is indigent,8 that if he does choose to answer, his statements
may be used against him in court. If the suspect begins to answer
questions, but then decides to remain silent, the police interrogation
must stop. If the suspect indicates he wishes to have a lawyer, ques-
tioning must stop until a lawyer arrives and has time to talk with the
accused. Waiver of these rights is possible if it is made knowingly
and intelligently; the burden is on the police to demonstrate that a
valid waiver has been made.
A child may come within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court
under California Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 if he has
committed an act which would be an adult misdemeanor or felony.
Only evidence which is admissible in an adult criminal trial can be
considered by the court when it is determining jurisdiction in the
case of a section 602 child.5 Therefore, the Miranda conditions-
precedent to the admission of confessions seem to apply. Even if
Miranda does apply in determining jurisdiction, the child has no
protection during the juvenile court intake process; counsel is not
available to insure his right not to incriminate himself.6 A California
District Court of Appeals has held that the Miranda procedural
guarantees as set forth by the Supreme Court do not apply to the
California juvenile court.7 The opinion of In re Castro' held these
1 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2 Id. at 442, citing and approving Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
3 Id. at 472.
4 Id. at 444-45.
r CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 701.
6 See In re Tahbel, 46 Cal. App. 755, 189 Pac. 804 (1920).
7 In re Castro, 243 A.C.A. 467, 474, 52 Cal. Rptr. 469, 473 (1966).
8 Ibid.
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guarantees inapplicable because a juvenile proceeding is not criminal
in nature and the court seeks only to help the child by giving him
guidance that his parents should have given.
This comment will demonstrate that euphemisms such as "treat-
ment" and "ward" do not change the fact that a juvenile proceeding
is criminal in nature; that the child has his liberty taken away by the
state and is tainted by his "treatment" record; that a juvenile has
the right not to be "treated" unless the state can clearly prove by
independently acquired, objective evidence that he must be treated;
that the guarantees of Miranda v. Arizona should apply to California
juvenile court proceedings to determine the child's constitutional
rights.
THE NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING
Courts have traditionally paid lip service to the proposition that
juvenile proceedings are not criminal in nature, but resemble a
guardianship action with the state acting as parens patriae. There
have been several statements from the judiciary in direct contradic-
tion to the general view. The foremost statement in California is
from In re Contraras:9
While the juvenile court law provides that adjudication of a minor
to be a ward of the court shall not be deemed to be a conviction of a
crime, nevertheless, for all practical purposes, this is a legal fiction,
presenting a challenge to credulity and doing violence to reason....
It is common knowledge that such adjudication when based upon a
charge of committing an act that amounts to a felony, is a blight
upon the character of and is a serious impediment to the future
of such minor .... And further as in this case, the minor is taken from
his family, deprived of his liberty and confined in a state institu-
tion .... 10
At least one jurist approves, labeling a juvenile proceeding as sui
generis." Another jurist points out that as soon as the juvenile denies
that he has committed the act alleged, the proceeding becomes a
judicial contest to determine conflicting facts and contentions, there-
fore a trial in every sense of the word.' 2 A federal judge said that it
is unnecessary to determine whether a juvenile proceeding is purely
civil or criminal in nature. Whether the enforced restraint be "in jail,
penitentiary, reformatory, training school, or other institution is im-
9 109 Cal. App. 2d 787, 241 P.2d 631 (1952); cited with approval in In re
Mikkelson, 226 Cal. App. 2d 467, 471, 38 Cal. Rptr. 106, 108 (1964).
10 Id. at 789-90, 241 P.2d at 633.
11 Ketcham, Legal Renaissance in the Juvenile Court, 60 N.W.L. REv. 585 (1965).
12 In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, -, 109 A.2d 523, 529 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (dissent
by Musmano, J.).
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material. What matters is the potential loss of liberty."' Therefore,
constitutional limitations are applicable. Responding to an argument
that a juvenile proceeding is not criminal in nature, a federal court
held that the ultimate function of a juvenile court is to determine the
guilt or innocence of the child. 4 These comments from judges and
legal writers indicate a current movement to reappraise the true
nature of the juvenile court proceeding. The remainder of this sec-
tion will explore juvenile intake procedures, informal probation, the
petition hearing, the character of the court's disposition after juris-
diction is found, and the effects of a juvenile record on the child's
future. An appraisal of California juvenile court proceedings can
only be made after exploring these areas.
Intake
The processing of a juvenile by the police and juvenile proba-
tion officer, subjects the youth to procedures which may deprive him
of his constitutional rights and create an adverse impression of the
law which will last the juvenile for his lifetime and affect his future
behavior. The California Welfare and Institutions Code' 5 allows a
policeman to take a person who is under eighteen years old into
custody if the officer has reasonable cause for believing that the
minor may fall under the juvenile court jurisdiction as a dependent
child, 6 a child who has delinquent tendencies, 7 or a child who has
violated a law of the State of California or the United States. 8
Section 625 does not require that the arresting officer first obtain a
warrant in cases where the suspected act is a misdemeanor not com-
mitted in his presence. Adults may be arrested for committing a mis-
demeanor only when the act is committed in the presence of the
officer, or the officer has a warrant for the suspect's arrest. 9 There-
fore, the law intended to protect the minor's best interests and to
nurture respect for authority appears to allow a policeman to take a
juvenile into custody for the commission of a misdemeanor on the
suggestion of an unfriendly neighbor.
A Governor's Special Study Commission was created to study
the California state juvenile court law and to make recommenda-
tions for its revision. In its report in 1960, the Commission suggests
that to curb unwarranted police detention and unadjudicated disposi-
tions, the arresting officer be compelled by statute to follow one of
13 United States v. Dickerson, 168 F. Supp. 899, 901 (D.C. Dist. 1958).
14 In re Poff, 135 F. Supp. 224, 225 (D.C. Dist. 1955).
15 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 625(a).
16 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 600.
17 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 601.
18 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 602.
19 In re Milstead, 44 Cal. App. 239, 186 Pac. 170 (1919); CAL. PEN. CODE § 835.
[Vol. 7
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three courses of action after he has taken a child into custody: (1)
release the minor without unnecessary delay; (2) cite him to the
probation department and release him to his parents after they have
agreed to appear before a juvenile probation officer; (3) deliver
him without unnecessary delay to a juvenile probation officer.2°
Section 626 of the Welfare and Institutions Code follows the recom-
mendations of the Commission except for one very important dif-
ference: part (a) in the code section states that a police officer "may
release such minor.. . ." The Commission report suggests the word-
ing "he must without unnecessary delay release a minor .... 121
There is a possibility of police abuse of the release alternative. This
detention at the whim of the police would directly circumvent the
intent of the law, and result in the same situation that existed be-
fore the 1961 revision of the California juvenile court system.22
If the police choose the alternative in section 626(c), they may still
detain the youth overnight at the police station, if the juvenile fa-
cility is closed.23 Even though the police are required to release the
minor after his parents promise to appear before a probation of-
ficer,24 this provision is also loosely constructed so that there is some
latitude on how long the child may be held before the promise must
be signed by his parents. One purpose of the Commission's recom-
mendations was to point out the abuses of police detentions of ju-
veniles and unadjudicated dispositions by an agency outside the
juvenile court. The 1961 revisions still allow some of these deten-
tion abuses to exist.
Juveniles who have committed serious offenses and whom the
arresting officer thinks should be detained are referred directly to a
juvenile probation officer. 25 The probation officer is required by sta-
tute to immediately investigate the "circumstances of the minor and
the facts surrounding his being taken into custody .... ,,26 In these
instances the probation officer continues the questioning already
started by the police. The child may already be intimidated by the
strange circumstances of the police and juvenile officers' interro-
20 REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S SPECIAL STUDY COMMEISSION ON JUVENILE JUS-
TICE, part I, at 65 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Comr'N RPT.].
21 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
22 CALIF. STAT. C. 1616, § 2 (1961).
23 39 OPs. CAL. ATTY. GEN. 269 (1962). Even though this problem may only
arise in the smaller counties of the state, detention by police under these circum-
stances could still involve a significant number of children.
24 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 626(b).
25 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 626. The arresting officer's decision to refer a
minor to juvenile court may be prejudiced: for example, poor and minority children
are referred before middle class children, and resistant youths 'are referred before
cooperative ones. See generally 25 FEDERAL PROBATION 47 (1961); 79 HARV. L.
REV. 775, 782 (1966).
26 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 628.
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gations. The probation officer questions the child alone; the situa-
tion is inherently coercive. These children need protection of their
constitutional rights even more than those who are released to their
parents under section 626(c).
A child faces a maximum of two and one half days without
counsel, plus an additional fifteen days in custody, before the state
must prove the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. The probation
officer must release the minor after his preliminary questioning ur-
less (a) the minor's own safety would best be served by detention,
(b) detention of the minor is necessary for the protection of the
person or property of another, (c) the minor is likely to flee the
court's jurisdiction, or (d) it appears that the minor has violated
an order of the juvenile court.2" Statute requires that a minor under
eighteen in the custody of a peace officer or probation officer must
be released within forty-eight hours unless a petition has been filed
by the juvenile probation officer.28 The code requires that a hearing
be held before a judge or referee to decide whether a minor should
be detained; this detention hearing must be held before the end
of the next judicial day following the filing of the probation officer's
petition.29 Therefore a maximum of two and one half days could
pass while the minor is legally detained and questioned, before he
or his parents have the statutory right to the presence of counsel. At
the detention hearing, the child may receive an additional fifteen
days of detention, pending the hearing on the petition filed by the
probation officer." Bail is not available to the child;" habeas corpus
may also be not available because the fifteen day detention period
might lapse before relief could be given. The minor is at the mercy
of the court. Although the amount of detention before the petition
hearing will be less for a juvenile than for an adult criminal await-
ing trial in superior court, he is still incarcerated just as the criminal
is.
Informal Probation
In all cases the probation officer may place the child on a pro-
gram of informal probation not to exceed six months. Before the
child can be placed on informal probation, the probation officer
must conclude that the minor is within the jurisdiction of the ju-
27 Ibid.
28 CAL. WELT. & INST. CODE § 631. The probation officer has the sole respon-
sibility of deciding to file a petition in juvenile court. CAL. WEiF. & INST. CODE§§ 650, 652-54.
29 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 632.
80 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 636.
31 In re Magnunson, 110 Cal. App. 2d 73, 74, 242 P.2d 362, 364 (1952).
32 In re Macidon, 240 A.C.A. 666, 49 Cal. Rptr. 861 (1966).
[Vol. 7
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venile court or soon will be, and have the consent of the minor's
parents.33 There are two inherent dangers in the informal probation
alternative. The conditions of probation curtail the child's freedom,
differing only in degree from actual incarceration; this curtailment
is imposed without judicial determination. As indicated in the Gov-
ernor's Special Study Commission on juvenile Justice, the super-
vision pattern for informal probation was the same as that for for-
mal probation in three fourths of the counties of the state.34 The
second inherent danger of informal probation is that the child may
be later tried for the same act in an adult criminal court. The code
section which prevents further criminal prosecution of an act com-
mitted by the juvenile which has been dealt with in juvenile
court applies only when a petition has been filed. 5 Consent from
the parents may be influenced by the power of the probation officer
to file a petition in juvenile court naming their child. The child has
his liberty taken away in substantially the same manner as he
would if a petition had been filed and jurisdiction found; but, he has
no guarantee that he may not be tried later in a criminal court,
and he has not had the benefit of an adjudication of his responsi-
bility for the act he is charged with. The possible benefits of informal
treatment are outweighed by the danger of loss of liberty without
adjudication of the minor's guilt.
Hearing
The code provides for a hearing to determine whether the child
is within the court's jurisdiction 6 and what disposition is necessary.
Any evidence relevant to the acts alleged in the petition is admissi-
ble."' From the mass of relevant evidence, the court must consider
only that which is admissible in a criminal trial; a preponderance
of such evidence must exist for jurisdiction in section 602 cases.
For determining jurisdiction in section 600 or section 601 cases, sec-
tion 701 further provides that the court must find that a preponder-
ance of evidence admissible in a civil case has been presented. The
effect of this section 9 is to allow juvenile courts to acquire jurisdic-
83 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 654.
34 COlm'N RIT. pt. II, at 47, table 57.
35 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 606. "When a petition has been filed in a juvenile
court, the minor who is the subject of the petition shall not thereafter be subject
to criminal prosecution based on the facts giving rise to the petition unless the
juvenile court finds that the minor is not a fit and proper subject to be dealt with
under this chapter and orders that criminal proceedings be resumed or instituted
against him."
36 CAL. WELT. & INST. CODE §§ 700, 701.





tion without establishing the child's responsibility beyond a reason-
able doubt, as in an adult criminal trial.
Although the code requires that the court's jurisdiction be de-
termined before disposition is made, the usual practice is to decide
both aspects of the case in a single bifurcated hearing. Section 706
of the Welfare and Institutions Code requires that the court receive
the probation officer's social study report and consider it while mak-
ing disposition of the case. The social study report contains infor-
mation of the child's background, past juvenile court contacts,
family and home conditions, and of the child's activities in school
and with his peer group. Although the code requires that the report
be used to make a proper disposition of the youth after jurisdiction
has been found, the report may sometimes influence the judge's de-
cision on jurisdiction." The evidence which was admitted at the
hearing, but which cannot be considered in finding jurisdiction, is
nevertheless before the judge and may also influence the determina-
tion of jurisdiction.
Character of the Wardship Disposition
After the court has determined that the minor is within itsjurisdiction as a section 601 or 602 child, it may make three types
of dispositions. It may refuse to adjudge the child a ward of the
court and put him on probation not to exceed six months; 4' it may
declare the child to be a ward of the juvenile court and commit him
to juvenile hall or similar facility for a period not to exceed three
months; 4" or if the child is declared to be a ward under section
602 he may be sent to a treatment facility of the California Youth
Authority. Section 506 requires dependent children to be separated
from section 601 and 602 wards.4 Section 601 wards and less ex-
perienced 602 wards may be mixed with more experienced delin-
quents. 5 Confinement in a California Youth Authority facility or
juvenile hall is not a pleasant experience. As Justice Musmano
states in his dissent in In re Holmes,46
The appellee Commonwealth categorically declares in its brief that
"commitment to an industrial school is not punishment." But it cer-
tainly does not come under the classification of pleasure.
40 See generally In re Halamuda, 85 Cal. App. 2d 219, 223, 192 P.2d 781, 783
(1948).
41 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 725.
42 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 730.
43 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 731.
,4 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 506.
45 10 STANFOPI L. REV. 471, 519 (1958); Comm'N RPT. pt. I, at 82.
46 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954).
[Vol. 7
CALIFORNIA JUVENILE COURT
To take a child from the comfort of his home . . . and confine him to
a building with whitewashed walls regimented routine [sic] and in-
stitutionalized hours is punishment in the strictest sense of the word.
47
A recent article submits that however lofty the institution's purposes
for treating the children, they are little better than prisons for the
young."
Stigma
One of the main purposes of the juvenile court law is to protect
the child offender from the stigma of a criminal conviction. Sec-
tion 503 of the Welfare and Institutions Code states that an order
declaring a minor to be a ward of the court will not be considered
a criminal conviction for any purpose, nor shall the proceeding be
considered criminal. The intent of the act is very commendable,
but does not describe the true effect of a juvenile record. Quoting
again from Justice Musmano's dissent in Holmes,
To say that a graduate of a reform school is not to be "deemed a
criminal" is very praiseworthy but this placid bromide commands no
authority in the fiercely competitive fields of everyday life ...
The grim truth is that a Juvenile Court record is a lengthening
chain that its riveted possessor will drag after him through childhood,
youthhood, adulthood and middle age.
49
While the code may refer to the child as a ward, and to the pro-
ceeding as in the nature of a guardianship, the public clearly does
not hold the same view.
50
The stigma of juvenile contact attaches to the child by press
releases of his arrest and public access of his juvenile record. A
child's record is created by each contact with authority." Although
access to the petition in juvenile court and the accompanying social
study is limited by statute,52 all other records held by the court and
47 Id. at -, 109 A.2d at 530.
48 Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MIN. L. REV. 547, 550 (1957).
49 In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, - , 109 A.2d 523, 528-29 (1954).
50 Welch, Delinquency Proceedings-Fundamental Fairness For the Accused in a
Quasi-Criminal Forum, 50 MINN. L. REV. 653 (1965). See In re Mikkelson, 226 Cal.
App. 2d 467, 471, 38 Cal. Rptr. 106, 108 (1964); Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va.
335, 38 S.E.2d 444 (1946); COMM'N RPT. pt. II, at 108-10. Cf. WASH. U.L.Q. 147,
150-62 (1966).
51 When a youth is stopped by a peace officer, even though he releases the child,
the officer will frequently file a contact report. If the youth is detained and taken
by the officer to police headquarters, an arrest record may be filled out. If the
youth is cited or taken to a juvenile probation officer, a file will be opened in the
juvenile probation department. 79 HARV. L. REV. 775, 784-85 (1966) ; 3 SANTA CLARA
LAW. 119, 121 (1963). Not only may these records be kept by each agency with
which the juvenile comes in contact, but also in central files for the county. Comm'N
RPT. pt. II, at 100.
52 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 827. Access is limited to authorized court per-
1966]
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police are open to the public.5" An employer or prospective employer
cannot be prevented from requesting information concerning a
prospective employee's previous records for arrests and detentions.5 4
Record of an arrest or detention as a juvenile is usually enough to
prejudice the consideration of an application for a job, a college
or university admission, or military service.55
Not only is the child's record open to public inquiry, but its
circulation is not adequately controlled. The code only attempts to
control juvenile records in the possession of the Bureau of Criminal
Identification and Investigation,56 and even this attempt is ineffec-
five. Information can be freely disseminated by any other agency
without including the disposition of the case. The record of a youth
who was certified to juvenile court but had no petition filed is freely
distributed by local agencies and may be sent to the F.B.I. or
C.I.I. Without any adjudication the child is tainted by his contact
with juvenile court.57
A person may petition the court to have his juvenile records
sealed.58 The court may determine that the person is entitled to
have his records sealed pursuant to the code section. This provi-
sion's effect is not very great. The juvenile court may retain juris-
diction over a ward until he reaches the age of twenty-one.59 Since
sonnel, the minor, his parents or guardian, the attorneys for the parties, and other
persons designated by the juvenile court judge.
53 36 OPs. CAL. ATrY. GEN. 1, 2 (1960); CAL. Gov. CODE § 1227. CAL. CODE Civ.
PROC. § 1892.
54 43 Ops. CAL. ATTY. GEN. 288, 290-91 (1964).
55 Cf., WASn. U.L.Q. 147, 150-62 (1966).
58 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 504. Only if the bureau includes a statement of
the disposition of the case, may it transmit information to another agency. This is
contrary to the recommendations of the Governor's Commission which would have
prohibited any agency from transmitting information to the F.B.I. or C.I.I. on thejuvenile unless he had been declared a ward of the court or had jurisdiction waived
by the court. Co~m'N RPT. pt. I, at 52.
57 CommIN'i RPT. pt. 1, at 52. "[A] juvenile may acquire a C.I.I. or F.B.I.
record even though he was arrested in error I The problem is further aggravated by
the wide dissemination of these records to police, state agencies and national agen-
cies."
58 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 781. A person may petition the juvenile court to
have his juvenile record sealed if he has had a petition filed against him in the past,
or if he was taken before a probation officer pursuant to section 625(c). If five
years have passed since the person was last in contact with the juvenile court and
the court determines that the person has not been convicted of a felony or of any
misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, and rehabilitation has been attained to the
satisfaction of the court, the judge may order the records of the juvenile offenses
sealed. See generally 40 Ops. CAL. ATTY. GEN. 50 (1962).
59 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 607. William L. Tregoning, Deputy Director of
the California Youth Authority, states that the de facto age limit for juvenile courtjurisdiction is eighteen; children over that age are prosecuted in criminal court as
a matter of course. Interview on August 11, 1965, in 79 Harv. L. Rev. 775, 793 n.83(1966). Although section 607 permits retention of jurisdiction for two years over a
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a person must wait five years after his last contact with juvenile
court before he can petition to have his records sealed, he may not
be able to petition until he is twenty-six years old. The damage
has been done by that time. His juvenile record has been examined
by the military, federal and state agencies, and future employers.
The stigma of a "non-criminal" contact has already made its effect."
The manner in which the juvenile is handled during intake and
at the hearing to determine the court's jurisdiction, and the future
effects of a juvenile court record, belie an "in the nature of a guardi-
anship" characterization of the proceedings. The proceedings are
very much criminal in nature; the child must be able to protect him-
self from his "protectors." Miranda guarantees should apply to the
juvenile court.
APPLYING MIRANDA
Constitutional Guarantees for Juveniles
Are constitutional guarantees normally applicable to adult
criminals also applicable to juveniles in the juvenile court process?
Several writers and judges have answered this question in the af-
firmative. A United States District Court has held that before en-
actment of federal juvenile court legislation, a child was subject to
the same punishment as an adult, that in the absence of any juvenile
court legislation, the child would be entitled to the same rights as
the adult criminal. Therefore, the court reasoned, the safeguards
created by the juvenile court act are in addition to those already
possessed by the child. The juvenile court act enlarged the rights
of the child by giving additional juvenile protections to supplement
the rights held by all adults in criminal actions." A California
case, In re Alexander,O2 held, "While the proceedings in the juvenile
court are for the welfare of boys and girls, still they deprive indi-
viduals of liberty. Therefore, the administration of this law must
conform to constitutional guarantees of due process of law."6
Another United States District Court noted a recent trend in
juvenile decisions indicating that the juvenile should have the same
child nineteen years of age or more, cases of juvenile court jurisdiction after the
child's twenty-first birthday are not probable.
60 Gough, Expungement of Adjudication Records of Juvenile and Adult Of-
fenders: A Problem of Status, WASH. U.L.Q. 147, 172 (1966). See Comment, 79
HARV. L. Rav. 775, 784-85 (1966); Comment, 51 CALx. L. REv. 421, 445-46 (1963).
61 In re Poff, 135 F. Supp. 224, 225 (D.D.C. 1955).
62 152 Cal. App. 2d 458, 313 P.2d 182 (1957).
63 Id. at 461, 313 P.2d at 184, quoted with approval in In re Macidon, 240
A.C.A. 666, 676, 49 Cal. Rptr. 861, 867-68 (1966).
1966)
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constitutional guarantees as an adult charged with the same acts. 4
A special committee of the Los Angeles Bar Association stated that
constitutional safeguards should be just as applicable in a juvenile
court proceeding as in another proceeding in which personal and
property rights are involved.65
In a publication of 1954, the Children's Bureau of the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare stated that special safe.
guards should surround a police interview with a child. 6 The child's
immaturity and the possibility of waiver of jurisdiction by the ju-
venile court and criminal prosecution require that the child and
his parents be informed of their right to have counsel present and to
refuse to answer questions. J. L. Allison, Executive Director of the
National Legal Aid and Defenders Association, argues that if the
charge against the juvenile is serious, counsel should be available to
the child at all stages of the processing, including intake.67
Right Against Self-Incrimination
In 1920, a California District Court of Appeal held that a minor
was entitled to the protection of article 1, section 13 of the Cali-
fornia Constitution which guarantees the right of a citizen to re-
main silent when being examined in a criminal case.6" This court
said,
The words "criminal case," as used in section 13 of article I of the Con-
stitution, are broader than "criminal prosecution." To bring a person
within the immunity of this provision, it is not necessary that the ex-
amination of the witness should be had in the course of criminal prose-
cution against him, or that a criminal proceeding should have been
commenced and be actually pending. It is sufficient if there is a law
creating the offense under which the witness may be prosecuted.69
Tahbel held that the child could not be compelled to confess to
the charge against him in juvenile court.7 °
In Miranda the court said that there can be no doubt that the
fifth amendment of the United States Constitution applies to all
situations where the individual's freedom of action is curtailed by
64 Application of Johnson, 178 F. Supp. 155, 160 (D.N.J. 1957). See United
States v. Morales, 233 F. Supp. 160 (D. Mont. 1964).
65 30 LA. BAR BULL. 333, 335-37 (1955).
66 CHIDREN's BUREAU, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, STAN-
DARDS FOR SPECIALIZED COURTS DEALING WITH CHILDREN, 1954. Quoted in Harling v.
United States, 295 F.2d 161, 163 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
67 NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE COURT JUDGES INSTITUTE AND CONFERENCE
PROGRAM, Feb. 27-29, 1964. Quoted in 79 HARV. L. REV. 775, 789 (1966).
68 In re Tahbel, 46 Cal. App. 755, 189 Pac. 804 (1920).
69 Id. at 758-59, 189 Pac. at 806.
70 Id. at 762, 189 Pac. at 808.
[Vol. 7
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being compelled to testify against himself.7 Although the right
against self-incrimination applies to a juvenile court in California,
a 1947 California case holds that even though a child may not be
compelled to incriminate himself, the court is not required to warn
the minor of his right.72
Therefore, as the law now stands in California, a child being
processed in the juvenile court has the right not to incriminate him-
self, but may assert this right only if he knows of it. He also has
the right to counsel, only if he asserts this right. The inconsisten-
cies are clear. The United States Supreme Court said in Escobedo
v. Illinois: 78
[N]o system of criminal justice can, or should, survive if it comes to
depend for its continued effectiveness on the citizens' abdication
through unawareness of their constitutional rights .... If the exercise
of constitutional rights will thwart the effectiveness of a system of
law enforcement, then there is something very wrong with that sys-
tem.
74
This applies with added emphasis to the juvenile court situation
where one of the announced goals of the system is to develop respect
for equal justice and law and order in the youthful offender. If the
right against self-incrimination can be used by some children, it
must be equally available to all.
In Miranda the court held that counsel was necessary to pro-
tect the fifth amendment rights of the individual being questioned by
the police.7" This would apply with more force to a juvenile pro-
ceeding where the individual being questioned does not have the
capacity of an adult. The substantive guarantees of Miranda which
compel the police to inform the individual of his rights not to in-
criminate himself and to have counsel present, even if he cannot
afford it, must be applied to the juvenile. If counsel is not available
to the juvenile at the intake stage, the right against self-incrimina-
tion, which Tahbel gives him, is without substance and easily cir-
cumvented by the interrogating officer.
Right to Counsel
Statute provides for notice of right to counsel at two places
in the proceedings: at the detention hearing,7" and in the notice of
71 384 U.S. at 467.
72 In re Dargo, 81 Cal. App. 2d 205, 183 P.2d 282 (1947). This opinion cites
In re Tahbel with approval.
78 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
74 Id. at 490.
75 384 U.S. at 469.
76 CAL. WELE. & INST. CODE § 633.
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the hearing to determine wardship.Y In a recent California Supreme
Court case, telephone notice to the mother that her son was being
detained and that he had a right to counsel at the detention hear-
ing, along with personal service of notice of the detention hearing
containing the same warning, was held sufficient notice of the right
to counsel.7 ' This case, In re Patterson, impliedly holds that a judge
does not have to place anything in the record to indicate that he has
made an examination of the facts and has determined that a proper
warning of the right to counsel has been made to the parents and
the child.7 ' The child may be without remedy if in fact improper
notice was given to the parent and the court made no indication in
the record; In re Patterson holds that a reviewing court must as-
sume that the trial court made this determination on proper exam-
ination of the facts if nothing in the record contradicts this pre-
sumption. 0 The legislature must have considered the right to
counsel in juvenile proceedings to be warranted, or the statutes
would not have provided for it. By inference from Patterson the
existing provisions for informing the child and his parents of this
right are inadequate. No provision is made for the parent who can-
not read English, or who does not understand the nature of the
right to counsel and the possible results of the juvenile hearing. A
waiver of the right may be assumed by the court if no counsel is
present at the hearings. A knowing, intelligent waiver is not re-
quired.
If the youth and his parents are indigent, counsel may be ap-
pointed; but, this right is at the judge's discretion in section 601
cases and non-felony section 602 cases. Juveniles charged with com-
mitting an act which would be an adult felony are entitled to ap-
pointed counsel only if the minor or the parent so requests.8' The
burden of requesting appointed counsel will be on the minor when
the parents of the child are apathetic or have an adverse interest,
or when they are not given proper notice. It is inconsistent that chil-
dren are not entitled to acquire property or enter into contracts in
California, but have the power to waive the right to counsel in a
hearing which may affect their future liberty. Quoting from People
v. Dorado,82 "The defendant who does not ask for counsel is the
77 CAL. WEL. & INST. CoDE § 659.
78 In re Patterson, 58 Cal. 2d 848, 850-51, 377 P.2d 74, 76, 27 Cal. Rptr. 10, 12
(1962).
79 Id. at 854, 377 P.2d at 78, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 14 (as interpreted in dissent of
Traynor, J.).
80 Id. at 853, 377 P.2d at 77, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 13.
81 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 634. The court may or may not, at its discretion,
decide to compensate counsel which it appoints. 38 Ops. CAL. ATTY. GEN. 154 (1961).
82 62 Cal. 2d 338, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1965).
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very defendant who most needs counsel." 3 While the adult criminal
has the right to counsel which is not dependent on his request, a
minor with less experience and capacity is burdened with the initia-
tive to request counsel. Miranda should apply so that the right to
counsel given by the legislature will be an effective protection of the
minor's rights.
Problems of Counsel During Juvenile Intake
Before Miranda can be implemented in juvenile proceedings,
courts must conclude that the problems connected with the presence
of counsel are outweighed by the good that can be accomplished.
The first problem that must be resolved is that of waiver.
Does the child have the capacity to understand the warnings
which Miranda requires? If so, can he make a valid waiver of his
right to counsel and silence? The case of Gallegos v. Colorado84 pro-
vides the answer to both questions. The prosecution contended that
the five-day detention and immaturity of the youth were immaterial
in determining whether the confession was coerced because the basic
ingredients of the youth's confession came "tumbling out" as soon
as he was arrested. The court answered the argument by stating:
He [the child] cannot be compared with an adult in full possession
of his senses and knowledgeable of the consequences of his admis-
sions. He would have no way of knowing what the consequences of his
confession were without advice as to his rights-from someone con-
cerned with securing him those rights-and without the aid of more
mature judgment as to the steps he should take in the predicament in
which he found himself. A lawyer or an adult relative or friend could
have given the petitioner the protection which his own maturity could
not .... Without some adult protection against this inequality, a four-
teen year old boy would not be able to know, let alone assert, such con-
stiutional rights as he had.85
Therefore, a child brought before a probation officer should be given
the warnings required in Miranda in the presence of an adult rela-
tive or friend, or his counsel. He should not be able to waive this
right by himself.
When a juvenile is taken into custody during the nighttime,
83 Id. at 351, 398 P.2d at 369-70, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 177-78. Compare CAL. PEN.
CODE § 858.
84 370 U.S. 49 (1962). A murder prosecution. Mr. Justice Douglas held that
under the circumstances, the confession obtained by state officers from the 14 year
old defendant, who had been held five days without officers sending for his parents
or seeing that he had advice of a lawyer or adult friend, and without bringing him
directly before a judge, was obtained in violation of due process, although the boy
had made earlier confessions.
85 Id. at 54.
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what will be the effect of counsel not coming directly to the juvenile
hall? California Welfare and Institution Code section 628 provi-
sions should apply; the probation officer must not question the
child until counsel is present or waiver has been made by the rule
set out above. The probation officer would then make the usual pre-
hearing detention decision as required by section 628, and delay
his questioning until counsel is present.
With the current state of the bar's education, would an attorney
be able to provide the quality of counsel needed in the juvenile court
application of Miranda? Although a recent survey of juvenile
court judges 8  found that sixty-eight per cent of those questioned
welcomed lawyers in all hearings before the court, three major short-
comings of lawyers were discussed.
The surveyed judges agreed that in general, attorneys lacked
understanding of juvenile court philosophy. Adversary oriented
lawyers generally are not fully prepared to deal with an informal
court which attempts to "treat." Another article suggests that the
presence of an attorney may prevent the court from working with
the child to his best interests.87 A recent article states that attorneys
as a group present a major stronghold of reaction against psychiatry
and modern juvenile court methods.88
Generally, a lawyer is not trained to relate to the social ramifi-
cations of his acts. 9 In the Skoler and Tenney survey, ninety-six
per cent of judges surveyed thought that counsel appearing in ju-
venile court needed special training and orientation beyond normal
"defense counsel" skills."
In representing children before the court at hearings, attorneys
now may fail to disassociate the interests of the parent from the
interests of the child."' The case frequently arises where a child
runs away from home and does not want to return. In his flight he
may commit a delinquent act. His interests may sometimes be better
served if he is taken out of the home environment. In these cases
will counsel retained by the parents represent the child's best in-
terests?
86 Skoler and Tenney, Attorney Representation in Juvenile Court, A Survey of
Juvenile Court Judges Serving the Nation's Largest Metropolitan Areas, 4 J. FAM.
LAW 77, 88 (1964). While this survey is addressed to the problems of representation
by counsel at wardship hearings, many points raised are applicable to representation
in the intake process.
87 Furlong, The Juvenile Court and the Lawyer, 3 J. FAm. LAW 1, 19 (1963).
88 Id. at 29-30.
89 Id. at 4-5.
90 4 J. FAm. LAW 77, 93-94 (1964).
91 Id. at 90-91.
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With counsel available to the minor during intake, will chil-
dren develop an attitude of trying to beat the rap? What effect
will this attitude, if it develops, have on future behavior? These
questions are beyond the scope of this comment. But another con-
sideration, however, should be what effect current inconsistencies
and prejudiced dispositions have on the child's future attitudes?
The present assumption among probation officers and juvenile
court theorists-is that a confession of guilt by the juvenile is es-
sential to developing a proper program of rehabilitation and treat-
ment." Is this assumption valid? This consideration is also beyond
the scope of this comment. There is a dearth of legal writing on this
problem area. At least one writer has stated that even though a
juvenile usually confesses his guilt to be an act he has committed,
he may retain a sense of injustice based on defective cognizance."'
Would the probation officer, "friend-of-the-child" relationship
be threatened by counsel's presence during intake? The duty of the
probation officer is to gather information for the court to use in a
future jurisdiction and disposition hearing. 4 Under the present
system, the probation officer attempts to "develop a personal re-
lationship" with the child. He trys to win the child's trust and re-
spect; a confession, he urges, is the only way to clear the child's
conscience and will result in better treatment. If a petition is filed
in juvenile court, the child sees the probation officer presenting in-
formation to the court like a policeman. The court finds jurisdiction
on the probation officer's information and makes a disposition based
on the probation officer's report. The child concludes that he has
been "conned." "Trust" and "friendship" disappear; the child is
now to be treated by a man he doesn't trust;95 this attitude may be
retained and affect future behavior.
What positive value would the presence of counsel during in-
take have? In addition to protecting the minor's constitutional rights
during intake, counsel may also assist the probation officer or police
by making the child's meaning understood if answering questions
is in the child's best interests. This would insure a full accurate re-
port to the court. 6
92 79 HARv. L. REV. 775, 779-83 (1966).
93 Matza, Delinquency and Drift 107 (1964).
94 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 581. "The probation officer . . . shall furnish to
the court such information and assistance as the court may require . .." CAL. WELF.
& INsT. CODE § 628: "Upon delivery to the probation officer of a minor who has
been taken into temporary custody under the provisions of this article, the probation
officer shall immediately investigate the circumstances of the minor and the facts
surrounding his being taken into custody . .. .
95 Matza, Delinquency and Drift 145-49 (1964).
96 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 470 (1966).
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If the child's case is not referred to the court for hearing, the
attorney can assist the probation officer in developing a plan of su-
pervision to the best interests of the minorY Probably the most
valuable contribution that the attorney will make during intake is
to make the child feel that he is being treated justly. The relation
between criteria of judgment and disposition in juvenile court is
obscure to the child. 8 If legal order is to exist and be respected,
the subjects of it must feel that justice prevails. A child may drift
into delinquent behavior when a sense of injustice prevails in his
view of the legal order. 9
If an attorney is present to interpret the workings of juvenile
court to the child, individualized justice will be better understood
by the child; the negative effect of the child's observation of in-
consistencies will be mitigated.
CONCLUSION
To characterize the juvenile court as civil is to ignore the obvi-
ous criminal character of the proceedings. Children are arrested
just like adult criminals, often for less cause. The children may be
incarcerated prior to the hearing on a juvenile probation officer's
petition. As a result of the juvenile court jurisdictional hearing, a
child may have his liberty taken away either partially or completely.
As a result of his contact with juvenile court, the child will have a
record which the public considers de facto criminal.
In rendering individualized justice, juvenile courts presently
subject the children before them to inconsistent treatment which
deprives them of their constitutional rights. A child has the right
not to incriminate himself, if he is aware of it. An indigent child
has the right to appointed counsel if he or his parents request it,
but even then this right is at the judge's discretion in non-felony
cases. A child may be "convicted" by a preponderance of evidence;
such "conviction" may be influenced by evidence not admissible in
a criminal trial.
As various authorities have agreed, constitutional guarantees
normally applicable to adult criminals should also apply to children
in juvenile court. The inherent risks of applying the processes of
97 30 L.A. BAR Bui. 333, 341 (1955).
98 See Matza, Delinquency and Drift 115 (1964).
99 Id. at 102. "Legal institutions, however, are an important element of society,
and by the very terms of sociological theory-the relation of man to society-their
connection with crime warrants consideration . . . But we sociologists have continued
to ignore the sense in which crime is a particular reaction to legal institutions." Id.
at 4.
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law to the individual demand that a child have the right to counsel
during intake and throughout the remainder of the juvenile court
process. The procedural guarantees set forth in Miranda v. Arizona
will remedy many inequities and will provide much needed pro-
tection of minor's constitutional rights.
H. Kenneth Branson
